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Abstract
This study develops a two-country model to explore how financial shocks in one country affect
its partner country’s business cycles through international trade. Unlike existing studies, I introduce
the mechanism of endogenous trade patterns, by which a shock can affect both the intensive and
extensive margins of trade. I also embed the mechanism of endogenous growth into the model to
indicate the potential for prolonged recessions, even for a transitory shock. I obtain the following four
main findings. First, an adverse financial shock in one country induces a global recession, even in the
absence of international financial transactions. Second, although the downward shift of real GDP in
the partner country is not so large, it can be very prolonged. Third, the real value of exports in the
partner drops more seriously than its real GDP. Finally, this drop is caused mainly by a change at the
intensive margin rather than the extensive margin.
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1 Introduction
The recent global recession during the 2008–2009 financial crisis drew more attention to the important
interdependence among countries. In Figure 1, I plot the level and growth rate of GDP for the United
States (U.S.) and an aggregate of the other 35 OECD member countries, where the shaded gray bar
denotes the 2008?2009 period.1 In the first panel, the GDP level in 2008:Q1 is normalized to one in
each economy. Without much difficulty, this figure illustrates three trends. First, before the crisis, the
economies have similar rates of trend growth. Second, during the crisis, they experienced a synchronized
economic downturn. Third, after the crisis, the growth rate recovered, and thereby the level of GDP in
both the U.S. and the other group of economies continued to move along the trend below the potential
trend without the crisis. Before the crisis, macroeconomic models with financial frictions were major
workhorses in business cycle studies. After the crisis, newer studies shed light on the shocks to the
financial constraint itself as a key influence on business cycles in a closed economy.2
Then, how do such financial shocks in one country affect business cycles in other countries? As
is well known, world trade also suddenly and severely contracted during the 2008–2009 global crisis.
According to WTO (2009), international trade in manufactured goods declined by about 30%, which is
more serious than the drop in the world GDP. This so-called “Great Trade Collapse” led researchers to
investigate the role of financial frictions in the trade decline. However, the existing studies on international
macroeconomics did not pay sufficient attention to international trade as the transmission channel. For
example, Devereux and Yetman (2010), Devereux and Sutherland (2011), Kollman et al. (2011), and
Perri and Quadrini (2018) assume an economy with a single traded good. Hence, these studies overlook
the possible transmission channel of the intratemporal trade of multiple goods. Dedola and Lombardo
(2012), Imura and Thomas (2016), and Yao (2019) employ a two-tradable-good framework and examine
the role of the terms of trade in the transmission of financial shocks across countries.3 However, all of
these works build on the Armington model, in which both the number of traded goods and trade pattern
are fixed.
Some empirical studies investigate how the financial crisis affected the intensive and extensive margins
of trade.4 Using a dataset of French firms, Bricongne et al. (2012) show that while the crisis affected all
1The data were obtained before Columbia became a member of the OECD.
2Examples of such studies include those by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Kahn and Thomas (2013), Buera and Moll
(2015), and Shi (2015).
3In Dedola and Lombardo (2012), home and foreign products consist of a continuum of horizontally differentiated goods,
but its size is normalized to one.
4Generally, the extensive margin of trade is the number of traded goods, trading firms, or trading partners, whereas the
intensive margin of trade is the value for existing firms or goods. The margins of exports and imports are defined similarly.
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Figure 1: Internationally synchronized recession (Source: OECD Statistics)
firms, the decline in trade volume occured mainly at the intensive margin rather than at the extensive
margin. Similarly, Behrens et al. (2013) report a total fall in Belgian exports of 26.23% between 2008:Q1
and 2009:Q1, and the decline at the intensive margin contributed 97.32% of this decrease (that is, the
value of already exported goods declined by 25.63%). These results may therefore seem to justify the
assumptions of a fixed number of traded goods and fixed trade patterns in these prior studies. However,
because such studies start by fixing these elements, explaining these facts in theory is still an open issue.
Against this background, we need a framework to investigate how financial shocks affect both the extensive
and intensive margins of trade.
In this study, I construct a simple two-country dynamic general equilibrium with just three twists:
financial frictions, endogenous growth, and international trade with endogenous trade patterns. To em-
bed financial frictions simply, I apply the heterogeneous-agent framework of Buera and Moll (2015) to
the two-country model. More precisely, I assume that investors have heterogeneous capital investment
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technologies and face credit constraints. Thanks to endogenous growth with learning-by-doing externali-
ties, it is possible to explain the persistent downward shift in the level of world GDP theoretically, even
though a shock itself is transitory, as we actually observed after the financial crisis.5 To make financial
shocks affect both the intensive and extensive margins of trade, I use the recent Ricardian trade model
developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and refined by Alvarez and Lucas (2007).6 The model assumes a
continuum of a variety of intermediate goods, the trade in which is subject to iceberg costs. A country’s
efficiency in producing each variety is subject to a realization of a random draw from a country-specific
distribution.7 Within this framework, I first analytically characterize the equilibrium where two countries
are asymmetric; that is, the trade costs, degree of financial frictions, and other key parameters can vary
across countries.
Then, I use the model to quantify the international transmissions of temporal financial shocks in one
country. I calibrate the two-country model so that one country is the U.S., which experiences an adverse
financial shock, and the other is the aggregate of the other OECD member countries. Following Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) and Buera and Moll (2015), I consider a credit crunch as the adverse financial shock;
that is, a negative shock to the investors’ credit constraints, which decreases their borrowing capacity.
The numerical analysis leads to four main findings. First, an adverse financial shock in one country
induces a recession not only in that country, but also in its partner country, even when only the goods
are traded. Second, the downward shift in the real GDP of the partner country that does not directly
experience the financial shock is not so large. However, the shift can be more sustained than in the
country that experiences the shock. Third, the real value of exports in the partner drops more seriously
than its real GDP. Fourth, this drop is caused mainly by the change at the intensive margin (the real
value of already exported goods) rather than at the extensive margin (the number of exported goods
here). The first and second findings imply that a recession in a country due to a domestic financial crisis
can propagate to other countries and have a sustained impact, even if policy makers restrict international
5In this sense, the model in this study shares some qualitative characteristics with those of existing studies incorporating
both financial frictions and endogenous growth. Mino (2015, 2016), Kunieda and Shibata (2016, 2017), and Hirano and
Yanagawa (2017) employ a simple AK framework. Guerron-Quintana and Jinnai (2019) quantitatively examine how liquidity
shocks are responsible for the recent recession using a class of R&D-based endogenous growth models with expanding variety.
Kobayashi and Shirai (2018) also use this class to examine a financial shock that redistributes wealth from firms to households
suddenly. All of these models assume a closed economy.
6Naito (2017) extends the Eaton–Kortum model to a three-country endogenous growth model of AK technology, and
investigates the growth effect of a permanent decline in one country’s iceberg trade costs. He does not consider any financial
frictions.
7Ohdoi (2018) introduces financial frictions into a two-country dynamic Ricardian model of Dornbusch–Fischer–Samuelson
type, and shows that a credit crunch in one country reduces the level of GDP in both countries. However, the model is
highly stylized, and thus not suited to obtain quantitative implications sufficiently.
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financial transactions using capital control policies. The third and fourth results are partly consistent
with the actual phenomenon of trade collapse. In addition, the fourth result means that even when the
extensive margin of exports is endogenous, the change at the intensive margin of exports has the dominant
role. In this sense, the results I obtain here complement the existing theoretical studies so far.
The mechanism is simple and explained as follows. Suppose that country 1 experiences a temporal
credit crunch and capital accumulation slows down. This leads to a lower level of capital in country
1 relative to that in country 2, and hence the capital price in country 2 declines relative to country 1.
Because this outcome makes the prices of tradable goods relatively cheaper in country 2, on the one
hand, the number of exported goods decreases in country 1, whereas it increases in country 2. That is,
the extensive margin of exports increases in country 2. On the other hand, the decline in the capital price
makes the investors’ real income in country 2, which in turn also harms capital investment in country 2.
Owing to the learning-by-doing mechanism, this negative effect on capital accumulation is amplified and
sustained, and generates a permanent downward shift in the GDP level in both countries, even though the
credit crunch is a transitory phenomenon. In addition, because both countries experience an economic
slowdown, demand for all tradable goods shrinks accordingly. Then, the intensive margin of both exports
and imports decreases in both countries. The numerical analysis under some sets of calibrated parameter
values here show that in country 2, the decrease in exports at the intensive margin outweighs the increase
in that at the extensive margin.
The results have some empirical relevances. After observing the trade collapse during the 2008-2009
crisis, some trade economists first identified the trade credit channel as its possible cause (e.g., Amiti
and Weinstein, 2011; Chor and Manova, 2012). Basically, exporters are likely to require more operating
funds than firms supplying products only to domestic markets because there is a longer time lag from
production to distribution when exporting. Thus, exporters often use letter of credit transactions. Some
researchers claim that a decrease in such transactions due to financial shocks induces the collapse of
trade. However, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is not so robust. For example, Bricongne
et al. (2012) report that the number of credit constrained firms in France did not increased drastically
during the crisis, and they conclude that financial constraints on French exporters played little role in
explaining the decline in overall French exports. Indeed, the results I obtain in this study do not rely
on the credit constraints of firms in tradable sectors, but to investors who conduct capital investment.
In addition, Behrens et al. (2013) claim that one of the most important factors explaining the decline
in Belgian exports is the destination country’s GDP growth rate. The result on the trade collapse in
the present study is also consistent with this finding. In summary, the results in this study suggest
that the connection with endogenous productivity growth and financial shocks can be a key to explain
the mechanism of global recession and trade collapse theoretically. To the best of my knowledge, only
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Feng and Lin (2013) examine the international transmission of financial shocks in a two-country model
with endogenous extensive margins of trade. However, their model differs significantly as they build on
monopolistic competition with exporters’ fixed costs. In addition, they do not embed any mechanisms of
endogenous productivity growth.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium analytically. Section 4 then calibrates the model and provides the quantitative results.
Section 5 concludes. The derivations of key equations are given in the Appendix.
2 Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The world consists of two countries, indexed by j or
n ∈ {1, 2}. The structure of international trade is based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). I extend their framework to a dynamic environment with capital accumulation along the
same line as Mutreja et al. (2014, 2018), Eaton et al. (2016), Alvarez (2017), and Ravikumar et al. (2018).
Following Mutreja et al. (2014, 2018) and Alvarez (2017), I assume no international financial transactions
and a trade balance is obtained.8 Capital and labor are also immobile between the two countries.
In this model, I classify households into two types of agents: a mass one of heterogeneous investors
and a mass Lj of homogeneous workers. Only investors have access to the ownership of domestic capital,
whereas workers do not have investment opportunities and cannot borrow/save: they are hand-to-mouth
consumers.
2.1 Firms
Intermediate composite firms: The world has a continuum of various intermediate goods. Each
variety, indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1], is tradable but is subject to iceberg trade costs. A representative assembling
firm in each country combines the intermediate goods to produce the intermediate composite according
to the following CES function:
Mj,t =
(∫ 1
0
(ymj,t(ω))
1−1/σdω
)σ/(σ−1)
,
where Mj,t is the output of the intermediate composite, y
m
j,t(ω) is the demand for variety ω, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution. As Eaton and Kortum (2002) show, the value of σ is not important in this
model. Let pmj,t(ω) denote the domestic price of variety ω and p
m
j,t denote the price of the intermediate
8 This financial autarky assumption is sometimes used, especially in the studies that pursue international trade as a
potential source of international co-movement. See, for instance, Heathcote and Perri (2002, 2004), Kose and Yi (2006), and
Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009).
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composite. The firm chooses the demand for varieties to maximize its profit, taking the prices as given.
This yields the following demand function for each variety:
ymj,t(ω) =Mj,t
(
pmj,t(ω)
pmj,t
)−σ
,
and the zero-profit condition:
pmj,t =
(∫ 1
0
(pmj,t(ω))
1−σdω
)1/(1−σ)
.
Intermediate goods firms: Intermediate goods firms produce each variety using capital, labor, and
the intermediate composite. The production function of variety ω in country j is
Y mj,t (ω) = Z
m
j,t(ω)
[
1
νm
(
Kmj,t(ω)
α
)α(Lmj,t(ω)
1− α
)1−α]νm (Mmj,t(ω)
1− νm
)1−νm
,
where Y mj,t (ω) denotes the output, while K
m
j,t(ω), L
m
j,t(ω), and M
m
j,t(ω) are demand for capital, labor, and
the intermediate composite, respectively. The parameter νm ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of value added in
total output and α ∈ (0, 1) denotes capital’s share of value added.
The term Zmj,t(ω) represents the technology level to produce variety ω in country j. I specify Z
m
j,t(ω)
as
Zmj,t(ω) = zj,t(ω)
(
Kj,t
Lj
)(1−α)νm
.
In this formulation, Kj,t and Lj are the aggregate capital and worker population in country j, respectively.
The dependency of the technology level on Kj,t captures the learning-by-doing externality in a spirit of
Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). To eliminate the “scale effect” property induced by the externality
simply, I assume that the capital per worker affects productivity.
The component zj,t(ω) denotes the sector-specific productivity in the production of variety ω. The
productivity draw comes from an independent Fre´chet distribution with shape parameter θ > 1 and
country-specific productivity Tj > 0:
Prob(zj,t(ω) ≤ z|j, t) = exp
(
−Tjz
−θ
)
.
The unit cost to produce variety ω is therefore bj,t/zj,t(ω), where bj,t is given by
bj,t ≡
(
Lj
Kj,t
)(1−α)νm (
rαj,tw
1−α
j,t
)νm (
pmj,t
)1−νm
. (1)
In (1), rj,t is the rental price of capital and wj,t is the wage rate.
Delivering one unit of intermediate good from country j to country n requires τnj units of this good,
where τjj = 1 and τnj > 1 for n ̸= j. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the first subscript is the destination
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country, while the second one is the origin country. The demand price of variety ω in country n is therefore
pmn,t(ω) = min
j∈{1,2}
{τnjbj,t/zj,t(ω)} .
Following the same calculation procedure as Eaton and Kortum (2002), the probability that country n
buys the product from country j is pinj,t ∈ (0, 1) for any variety:
pinj,t =
Tj,t (τnjbj,t)
−θ∑
j′∈{1,2} Tj′,t
(
τnj′bj′,t
)−θ , (2)
where
∑
j pinj,t = 1. Then, p
m
j,t given above is rewritten as
pmj,t = γ
 ∑
n∈{1,2}
Tn,t (τjnbn,t)
−θ
−1/θ . (3)
In (3), γ ≡ {Γ (1− (σ − 1)/θ)}1/(1−σ) where Γ(·) is the gamma function: Γ(h) =
∫∞
0 u
h−1 exp(−u)du. I
assume θ > σ − 1 such that Γ(·) is well defined.
Final good firms: Each country has a single non-traded final good used for domestic consumption and
investment. The final good firm produces output Y fj,t using capital K
f
j,t, labor L
f
j,t, and the intermediate
composite Mfj,t according to
Y fj,t = Z
f
j,t
 1
νf
(
Kfj,t
α
)α(
Lfj,t
1− α
)1−ανf ( Mfj,t
1− νf
)1−νf
,
where νf ∈ (0, 1). Letting pfj,t denote the price of the final good, the zero-profit condition resulting from
profit maximization is
pfj,t =
1
Zfj,t
(
rαj,tw
1−α
j,t
)νf (
pmj,t
)1−νf
. (4)
The technology Zfj,t is specified such that it also exhibits the learning-by-doing externality.
Zfj,t =
(
Kj,t
Lj
)(1−α)νf
.
2.2 Households
Investors: Investors are heterogeneous and indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The following expected expected utility
function expresses the preferences of investor i in country j:
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt ln cij,t
]
,
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where cij,t is consumption and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The budget constraint evaluated in terms
of the domestic final good is
rj,t
pfj,t
kij,t − (1 + r
d
j,t)d
i
j,t−1 + d
i
j,t = c
i
j,t + ι
i
j,t, (5)
where kij,t is the investor’s capital, d
i
j,t is the end-of-period stock of the one-period real bond (i.e., the
investor’s debt evaluated in terms of the final good), rdj,t is the real interest rate, and ι
i
j,t is the gross
investment.
Investors receive an idiosyncratic capital quality shock. Let xij,t = ι
i
j,t+ (1− δ)k
i
j,t denote the amount
of capital before the shock. Then, the capital in the next period is
kij,t+1 = s
i
j,tx
i
j,t, (6)
where sij,t is continuous, included in [smin, smax], and i.i.d. across not only investors but also periods.
Hereafter, I refer to sij,t as investor i’s investment productivity. Each investor draws his/her productivity
from the time-invariant distribution G(s) ≡ Prob
(
sij,t ≤ s | j
)
. As in Buera and Moll (2015), I assume
that investors can make decisions in a period with knowledge of their investment productivity in this
period, whereas their productivity in future periods is not observable.
Let aij,t denote the investor’s net worth at the end of period t: a
i
j,t = x
i
j,t − d
i
j,t. In this model, each
investor faces the following credit constraint:
xij,t ≤ (1 + λj,t)a
i
j,t, (7)
where λj,t > 0 captures the financial frictions in country j. The term λj,t creates the upper bound of the
investors’ leverage ratios and all investors are subject to this constraint. If constraint (7) is binding, then
λj,t is exactly the investors’ leverage ratio. This constraint also means that at most, investors can finance
a fraction λj,t/(1 + λj,t) of investment externally:
dij,t
xij,t
≤
λj,t
1 + λj,t
∈ [0, 1].
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Buera and Moll (2015), and other prior studies, I assume that
the credit constraint is subject to a financial shock:
ln(λj,t+1/λj) = ρλ(lnλj,t/λj) + εj,t+1,
where λj is the baseline value of λj,t and εj,t is an i.i.d. shock. This shock is common to all investors in
a country. The value of λj,t is realized at the beginning of a period. The parameter ρλ ∈ (0, 1) captures
the persistence of the financial shock.
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An investor maximizes the expected utility function subject to (5)–(7). This optimization problem is
solved as
aij,t = β
[(
rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ
)
kij,t − (1 + r
d
j,t)d
i
j,t−1
]
,
(
xij,t, d
i
j,t
)
=

(
0, −aij,t
)
if smin < s
i
j,t < s
c
j,t,(
(1 + λj,t)a
i
j,t, λj,ta
i
j,t
)
if scj,t ≤ s
i
j,t < smax,
the derivation of which is in the Appendix. In the second equation, scj,t is the cutoff productivity of
investment, defined as
scj,t ≡
1 + rdj,t+1
rj,t+1/p
f
j,t+1 + 1− δ
.
In the next section, it will be shown that the equilibrium value of scj,t is determined within the interval
of [smin, smax]. If the investors’ investment productivity is below the cutoff in a period, then they are
not active as investors in this period, but lend all financial funds to other active investors. If they are
productive enough, then they want to leverage their investment by additional funds from others as much
as they can. The resulting leverage ratio of these investors is λj,t. Thus, both financial frictions and the
idiosyncratic shocks are important to induce the spread of the rate of returns between purchasing capital
and lending to other agents.
Let Aj,t =
∫ 1
0 a
i
j,tdi denote the investors’ net worth:
Aj,t = β
[
(rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ)Kj,t − (1 + r
d
j,t)Dj,t−1
]
. (8)
where Dj,t−1 is the aggregate net supply of the one-period bonds in period t − 1. Accordingly, the
consumption aggregated over all investors is CEj,t ≡ (1 − β)Aj,t/β. Then, x
i
j,t is aggregated over all
investors in country j:
Xj,t = (1 + λj,t)(1−G(s
c
j,t))Aj,t. (9)
The aggregate capital in the next period Kj,t+1 is
Kj,t+1 =
1
1−G(scj,t)
∫ smax
scj,t
sdG(s)Xj,t. (10)
Workers: Each worker is endowed with one unit of time in each period and inelastically supplies to the
domestic labor market, meaning that the population of workers Lj is also the aggregate labor supply.
9
The workers’ aggregate consumption is thus CWj,t = wj,tLj/p
f
j,t.
9Even if each worker endogenously determines his/her labor supply, one can obtain the same result as long as the balanced
growth equilibrium occurs. For example, suppose that each worker maximizes his/her utility function ln cWj,t + ζ ln(1− hj,t)
subject to the budget constraint pfj,tc
W
j,t = wj,thj,t, where c
W
j,t and hj,t are the consumption and labor supply per worker,
respectively. The aggregate labor supply is thus Ljhj = Lj/(1 + ζ).
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2.3 Market-Clearing Conditions
The market-clearing conditions of capital, labor, and the intermediate composite in country j are, respec-
tively,
Kj,t =
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
Kmj,t(ω)dω +K
f
j,t,
Lj =
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
Lmj,t(ω)dω + L
f
j,t,
Mj,t =
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
Mmj,t(ω)dω +M
f
j,t,
where Ωj,t ⊂ [0, 1] denote the set of varieties produced in country j. Let Ωnj,t ⊂ Ωj,t denote the set of
varieties that country j exports to country n. By the law of large numbers, their measures are pinj,t.
Using this definition, the market-clearing condition of each variety produced in country j is
∀ω ∈ Ωj,t, Y
m
j,t (ω) = y
m
j,t(ω) +
τnjy
m
n,t(ω) if ω ∈ Ωnj,t,
0 otherwise.
The final good market clears in each country:
Y fj,t = C
E
j,t + C
W
j,t +Xj,t − (1− δ)Kj,t.
Since there is no international lending/borrowing, the following trade balance condition applies:∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω =
∫
ω∈Ωnj,t
pmn,t(ω)y
m
n,t(ω)dω,
where the left-hand-side is the imports of country j and the right-hand-side is that of country n. From
these market-clearing conditions, the firms’ zero-profit conditions, and Walras’ law, the following budget
constraint automatically holds:
Aj,t = (rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ)Kj,t − (1 + r
d
j,t)Dj,t−1 + (wj,t/p
f
j,t)Lj − (C
E
j,t + C
W
j,t ).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium conditions
In this section, I provide the equilibrium conditions, with a focus on the derivation of key equations. I
provide the derivation of supplemental equations in the Appendix.
The wage income wj,tLj is
wj,tLj =
1− α
α
rj,tKj,t,
11
which I derive in the Appendix. The learning-by-doing externalities in the final and intermediate goods
sectors are therefore expressed as(
Kj,t
Lj
)(1−α)ν
=
(
α
1− α
wj,t
rj,t
)(1−α)ν
(ν = νm, νf ).
Substituting this result into equations (1) and (4) yields bj,t and p
f
j,t, respectively, as
bj,t = ψ
m(rj,t)
νm(pmj,t)
1−νm ,
and
pfj,t = ψ
f (rj,t)
νm(pmj,t)
1−νm , (11)
where ψm ≡ [(1− α)/α](1−α)ν
m
> 0 and ψf ≡ [(1− α)/α](1−α)ν
f
> 0 . I define
Bj ≡ T
1/θ
j /γ,
which represents the parameter that reflects country j’s overall productivity in the intermediate goods
sector. Substituting the obtained bj,t into equation (3),
pmj,t =
 ∑
n∈{1,2}
[
τjnψ
m(rn,t)
νm(pmn,t)
1−νm
Bn
]−θ
−1/θ
. (12)
Since the denominator of the right-hand side of (2) is (pmn,t/γ)
−θ, equation (2) becomes
pinj,t =
(
1
pmn,t
τnjψ
m(rj,t)
νm(pmj,t)
1−νm
Bj
)−θ
. (13)
In this model, the condition for the trade balance is rewritten as
pi12,tr1,tK1,t = pi21,tr2,tK2,t, (14)
the derivation of which is in the Appendix. In this study, capital in country 1 is chosen as the numeraire:
r1,t = 1.
Thus, given capital stock Kj,t, the variables p
f
j,t, p
m
j,t, pinj,t, and r2,t are determined from equations (11)–
(14).
Turn to the dynamic behavior of the model. Without international financial transactions, the bonds
are in zero net supply in each country. Since this means Dj,t = Xj,t − Aj,t = 0 for all t, equation (8)
determines the net worth of the investors at the end of period t:
Aj,t = β
(
rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ
)
Kj,t. (15)
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In addition, equation (9) implies
1−G(scj,t) =
1
1 + λj,t
. (16)
From this equation, the equilibrium value of the cutoff scj,t is uniquely determined within the interval of
[smin, smax]:
scj,t = s
c(λj,t), ds
c(λj)/dλj =
1−G
(1 + λ)G′
> 0.
Then, using equations (10), (16), and Xj,t = Aj,t, the capital in the next period Kj,t+1 is
Kj,t+1 = f(λj,t)Aj,t, (17)
where function f(λj,t) is given by
f(λj,t) ≡ (1 + λj,t)
∫ smax
sc(λj,t)
sdG(s), df(λj)/dλj =
f(λj)− s
c(λj)
1 + λj
> 0,
where the sign of df(λj)/dλj comes from the fact that f(λj) corresponds to the tail-conditional average
of s.10
Given Kj,t and λj,t, the variables p
f
j,t, p
m
j,t, pinj,t, r2,t, s
c
j,t, Aj,t, and Kj,t+1 are determined from the
system of equations (11)–(17). Equations (11)–(14) constitute the bloc of the Eaton–Kortum model, which
is affected by capital stock in each country. Given Kj,t, these equations jointly determine the patterns
of trade, prices of tradable intermediate goods, price of the domestic final good, and the rental price
of domestic capital. Equations (15)–(17) constitute the bloc of capital accumulation, which is affected
by both international trade and financial frictions. The prices determined in the Eaton–Kortum bloc
affect the investors’ net worth Aj,t through equation (15). After the aggregate financial shock λj,t and
the idiosyncratic shock sij,t are realized, the financial market equilibrium in each country (16) determines
the cutoff of investors’ productivity to actively invest, scj,t. The financial shock, through its impact
on financial markets to sort productive investors, is a key determinant of the average productivity of
investment, captured by f(λj,t). Then, as equation (17) shows, the capital stock in period t+ 1 depends
significantly on international trade (via Aj,t) as well as the financial shock (via f(λj,t)). In the next
period, capital stock Kj,t+1 in turn influences the trade equilibrium in the Eaton–Kortum bloc through
equation (14). Because of the learning-by-doing externalities, this interplay also governs the endogenous
growth rate of productivity in each country.
3.2 Equilibrium prices
Because of the learning-by-doing externalities, the wage rate disappears from the equilibrium conditions
(11)–(17), and one can treat the model as a simple one-factor model. Therefore, the theorem on the
10Since (1 + λj) = 1/(1−G(s
c
j)), f(λj) is expressed as f(λj) =
∫ smax
sc(λj,t)
sdG(s)/(1−G(sc(λj))).
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existence of equilibrium established by Alvarez and Lucas (2007) is applied to the static equilibrium in
this model. However, the following two lemmas are useful to characterize the balanced growth equilibrium
in this model.
Equation (12) implies(
pm1,t
)−θ
= (ψm)−θ
{
Bθ1(p
m
1,t)
−θ(1−νm) +Bθ2τ
−θ
12
[
(r2,t)
νm(pm2,t)
1−νm
]−θ}
, (18)(
pm2,t
)−θ
= (ψm)−θ
{
Bθ1τ
−θ
21 (p
m
1,t)
−θ(1−νm) +Bθ2
[
(r2,t)
νm(pm2,t)
1−νm
]−θ}
. (19)
I introduce a new variable: P˜mt ≡
(
pm2,t/p
m
1,t
)θ
. The above two equations imply
P˜mt = H(P˜
m
t ; r2,t)
≡
(P˜mt )
1−νm + τ−θ12 (B2/B1)
θ(r2,t)
−θνm
τ−θ21 (P˜
m
t )
1−νm + (B2/B1)θ(r2,t)−θν
m
.
Lemma 1.
(i) Given r2,t > 0, there uniquely exists the solution to equation P˜
m = H(P˜m; r2,t).
(ii) Let P˜m(r2,t) denote the solution. P˜
m(r2,t) is an increasing function of r2,t and
lim
r2,t→0
P˜m(r2,t) = τ
−θ
12 ,
lim
r2,t→∞
P˜m(r2,t) = τ
θ
21.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Then, equations (18) and (19) uniquely provide the price of the intermediate composite as a function
of r2,t: p
m
j,t = P
m
j (r2,t).
Lemma 2. Pm1 (r2,t) and r2,t/P
m
2 (r2,t) are strictly increasing functions of r2,t and
lim
r2,t→0
1
Pm1 (r2,t)
=∞, lim
r2,t→∞
1
Pm1 (r2,t)
= (B1/ψ
m)1/ν
m
,
lim
r2,t→0
r2,t
Pm2 (r2,t)
= (B2/ψ
m)1/ν
m
, lim
r2,t→∞
r2,t
Pm2 (r2,t)
=∞.
Proof. From (18) and (19), Pm1 (r2,t) and r2,t/P
m
2 (r2,t) are given by
Pm1 (r2,t) = (ψ
m)ν
m
{
Bθ1 +B
θ
2τ
−θ
12 (r2,t)
−θνm
(
P˜m(r2,t)
)−(1−νm)}−1/(θνm)
,
r2,t/P
m
2 (r2,t) = (ψ
m)−1/ν
m
{
Bθ1τ
−θ
21 (r2,t)
θνm
(
P˜m(r2,t)
)1−νm
+Bθ2
}1/(θνm)
.
From these equations and Lemma 1, it is apparent that this lemma is true.
Substituting pmj,t = P
m
j (r2,t) into (11) yields the real rate of return from capital investment as follows:
1
pf1,t
=
1
ψf
1
(Pm1 (r2,t))
1−νf
,
r2,t
pf2,t
=
1
ψf
(
r2,t
Pm2 (r2,t)
)1−νf
. (20)
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3.3 Balanced growth equilibrium
In this section, I consider the case where λj,t = λj by assuming εj,t = 0. The balanced growth equilibrium
is the equilibrium at which K1,t and K2,t grow at the same, constant rate. From equations (15) and (17),
1 + g∗ = βf(λ1)(1/p
f
1,t + 1− δ) = βf(λ2)(r2,t/p
f
2,t + 1− δ), (21)
where g∗ is the growth rate in the balanced growth equilibrium, hereafter referred to simply as the
balanced growth rate. An asterisk over a variable indicates the balanced growth equilibrium. Since pf1,t
and r2,t/p
f
2,t are functions of r2,t, equation (21) shows that r2,t must be constant. Therefore, I omit the
time subscript. Substituting (20) into (21) gives the following equation to determine r2:
R1(r2) = R2(r2),
where
Rj(r2) ≡ f(λj)
 1
ψf
(
rj
Pmj (r2)
)1−νf
+ 1− δ
 .
From Lemma 2, R1(r2) is a strictly decreasing function, while R2(r2) is a strictly increasing function with
respect to r2. In addition,
lim
r2→0
[R1(r2)−R2(r2)] > 0, lim
r2→∞
[R1(r1)−R2(r2)] < 0,
which means that there uniquely exists r∗2 > 0 that solves R1(r2) = R2(r2). Once r
∗
2 is determined, the
price of the intermediate composite is given by pm∗j ≡ P
m
j (r
∗
2). Substituting r
∗
2 and p
m∗
j into (11) and
(13) yields pf
∗
j and pi
∗
nj , respectively. Since the prices become constant, all quantity variables grow at the
same rate of g∗. Let k2,t ≡ K2,t/K1,t denote the level of capital in country 2 relative to that in country
1. In the balanced growth equilibrium, it is constant and given by k∗2 ≡ pi
∗
12/(r
∗
2pi
∗
21) from (14).
Proposition 1. The model has the balanced growth equilibrium in which the two countries grow at the
balanced growth rate of g∗.
In the rest of this section, I examine the comparative statics of the balanced growth equilibrium to
gain insight into the inner workings of the model. Figure 2 depicts how financial frictions in each country
influence the determination of g∗ and r∗2. A lower λj moves the location of the βRj(r2) curve downward.
Without loss of generality, suppose that λ1 becomes small. This decreases the borrowing capacity of
the investors in this country, which in turn induces the entry of less productive investors who otherwise
become inactive. This inefficient reallocation of financial resources lowers the average productivity of the
aggregate investment in country 1. Then, capital accumulation slows down in country 1, making the level
15
growth rate growth rate
Figure 2: Comparative statics of the balanced growth equilibrium
of capital in country 1 small relative to that in country 2. In response to this, r∗2 becomes low. This
also slows down the wealth accumulation in country 2. Through the learning-by-doing mechanism, this
negative effect on capital accumulation is amplified and sustained, leading both countries to settle at a
lower balanced growth rate.
The relative price of capital in turn affects the patterns of international trade. From equation (13),
pi∗12 =
(
τ12ψ
m
B2
)−θ ( r∗2
Pm2 (r
∗
2)
)−θνm 1
P˜m(r∗2)
,
pi∗21 =
(
τ21ψ
m
B1
)−θ
(Pm1 (r
∗
2))
θνmP˜m(r∗2).
From Figure 2, r∗2 is low (high) when λ1 (λ2) is low. From this result and Lemmas 1 and 2, pi
∗
12 is
accordingly high (low), whereas pi∗21 is low (high). For country j, pijn,t and pinj,t are numbers of importing
and exporting varieties, respectively. Suppose that λ1 is low, and hence r
∗
2 is low. This provides downward
pressure to the price of the intermediate goods produced in country 2. Thus, country 1’s importing
varieties increase while its exporting varieties decrease.
4 Numerical analysis of financial shocks
4.1 Calibration
A period in the model corresponds to a quarter of a year. I identify country 1 as the U.S. and country 2
as an aggregate of the other 35 OECD member countries as a proxy for the rest of the world. I assume
that the world economy is on a balanced growth path before 2008:Q3.
The model has 15 parameters and Table 1 reports calibration results. I set the discount factor, capital
share, and depreciation rate to β = 0.98, α = 0.35, and δ = 0.025, respectively, which are standard in the
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Source/Targets
β 0.98 Exogenously chosen
α 0.35 Exogenously chosen
δ 0.025 Exogenously chosen
σ 2 Exogenously chosen
νm 0.5 Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
νf 0.75 Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
θ (i)7.9, (ii)6.7, (iii)4, (iv)2 Four existing studies
λ1 2.226 D
E∗
1,t−1/K
∗
1,t = 0.69
λ2 2.226 r
d∗
1
= 1.041/4 − 1
smin 0.913 r
d∗
1
= rd∗
2
smax 1.016 f(λ1) = 1
τ12 (i)1.196, (ii)1.236, (iii)1.422, (iv)2.024 g
∗ = 5.8× 10−3
τ21 (i)1.196, (ii)1.236, (iii)1.422, (iv)2.024 τ12 = τ21
B1 (i)5.66× 10
−3 (ii)5.62× 10−3, (iii)5.45× 10−3, (iv)5.03× 10−3 (1− νf )pi∗
12
/νm = 0.135
B2 (i)5.78× 10
−3 (ii)5.76× 10−3, (iii)5.68× 10−3, (iv)5.47× 10−3 r∗
2
k∗
2
= 1.947
literature. In the Eaton–Kortum model, the elasticity of substitution across intermediate varieties σ is not
quantitatively important. I therefore set this at σ = 2 to satisfy the technical restriction 1+(1−σ)/θ > 0.
As for the shares of value added (νf , νm), I follow Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to set these at νf = 0.75
and νm = 0.5. The dispersion in the productivity levels in the intermediate goods sector θ varies in the
existing studies. I therefore consider four cases: (i) θ = 7.9 (the estimate for OECD countries by Waugh
2010); (ii) θ = 1/0.15 ≃ 6.66 . . . (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Alvarez, 2017); (iii) θ = 4 (Mutreja et al.,
2014, 2018; Ravikumar et al., 2018); and (iv) θ = 2 (Eaton et al., 2016).11
There are 8 parameters to be calibrated: λ1, λ2, smin, smax, τ12, τ21, B1, and B2. In each case
of θ, these parameters are chosen such that the endogenous variables achieve their target values in the
balanced growth equilibrium. The distribution of sij,t is specified as the uniform distribution: G(s) =
(s − smin)/(smax − smin). The details of the calibration is given in the Appendix. The average growth
rate of total GDP for the OECD countries from 2001:Q1 to 2008:Q2 is 0.58%, or about 2.34% per year.12
I therefore set the growth rate at g∗ = 0.0058. I assume that the countries have equal real interest rates
11Note I use θ as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), Eaton et al. (2016), and Mutreja et al. (2018), which correspond to 1/θ in
Waugh (2010), Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Mutreja et al. (2014), and Alvarez (2017).
12The data are from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts. The GDP is in international PPP dollars with 2015 as the
reference year in all countries. During this period, the average growth rate of GDP was 0.61% (≃ 2.44% annually) in the
U.S. and 0.57% (≃ 2.29% annually) in the other OECD countries.
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and set the common rate at rd∗1 = r
d∗
2 = (1.04)
1/4 − 1. As I show in the Appendix, rd∗1 = r
d∗
2 implies
λ1 = λ2. Let D
E
j,t−1 = λj,t(1 − G(s
c(λj,t)))Aj,t−1 denote the debt of the active investors in the balanced
growth equilibrium. I set the long-run ratio of debt to capital to
DEj,t−1
Kj,t
=
λ1(1−G(s
c(λ1)))
f(λ1)
= 0.69,
following Buera and Nicolini (2017), who report that the average ratio of liabilities to non-financial assets
for the U.S. non-financial business sector between 1997:Q3 and 2007:Q3 is 0.69. I assume f(λ1) = 1; that
is, in the balanced growth equilibrium, the final good is transformed into capital on a one-to-one basis on
average, as in standard macroeconomic models.
In this model, I define the real GDP in country j as
GDPj,t ≡
rj,tKj,t + wj,tLj
pfj,t
=
rj,tKj,t
αpfj,t
,
and the real value of this country’s imports is
Importsj,t ≡
pijn,tp
m
j,tMj,t
pfj,t
=
1− νf
νm
pijn,tGDPj,t.
I set the share of imports to GDP in country 1 to (1− νf )pi∗12/ν
m = 0.135, which is the average ratio of
imports to GDP for the U.S. obtained from the quarterly data of 2001:Q1–2008:Q2. The GDP ratio of
country 2 to country 1 is
pf2,tGDP2,t
pf1,tGDP1,t
≡ r2,tk2,t.
I then set this value to r∗2k
∗
2 = 1.947, which is the average GDP ratio from 2001:Q1 to 2008:Q2.
Finally, I assume τ12 = τ21 = τ when I calibrate the trade costs τjn and Bj . Table 1 shows that the
value of τ gets larger as the value of θ becomes smaller. This is because a smaller θ induces the trade
of more varieties by increasing the variability in the production technologies. The calibrated values of
trade costs increase accordingly, such that the economy in each case achieves the same balanced growth
equilibrium.
4.2 Impulse responses
In period 0, the economy is on the balanced growth path. At the beginning of period 1, λ1,t drops unex-
pectedly by 20% relative to its baseline value. Thereafter, the economy experiences no exogenous shocks.
The leverage ratio deterministically recovers to its baseline according to ln(λ1,t/λ1) = ρλ ln(λ1,t−1/λ1).
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Table 2: Convergence coefficient (ρλ = 0.9 for all cases)
θ (i)7.9 (ii)6.7 (iii)4 (iv)2
ρ∗k 0.9993 0.9991 0.9987 0.9978
I set the parameter for the persistence of shocks to ρλ = 0.9, which is a standard choice in the litera-
ture. The model enables us to numerically examine the outcome when both countries experience financial
shocks. However, in this study, I consider only the case in which country 1 experiences the shocks; that is,
λ2,t = λ2 for all t, because I focus on the quantification of the international transmission of country-specific
shocks in one country to another via trade.
From the definition of capital in country 2 relative to that in country 1, k2,t ≡ K2,t/K1,t, equations
(14) and (17) are rewritten as
pi12,t = pi21,tr2,tk2,t, (22)
k2,t+1 =
f(λ2)(r2,t/p
f
2,t + 1− δ)
f(λ1,t)(1/p
f
1,t + 1− δ)
. (23)
In the balanced growth equilibrium with λj,t = λj , the variables p
m
j,t, p
f
j,t, pinj,t, r2,t, and k2,t are stationary
at (pm∗j , p
f∗
j , pi
∗
nj , r
∗
2, k
∗
2) based on the system of equations (11), (12), (13), (22), and (23). I log-linearize
the system around them and compute the impulse response functions for these variables. The log-linear
approximation of the system is given in the Appendix.
I then numerically derive the time series of all variables. In doing so, I calculate the percentage
deviations from their baseline values with no shock to the economy. For example, let
GDP ∗j,t ≡
r∗jK
∗
j,t
αpf∗j
=
r∗jK
∗
j,0(1 + g
∗)t
αpf∗j
,
denote the real GDP level under the alternative scenario without a shock. I calculate 100×ln(GDPj,t/GDP
∗
j,t)
with the initial condition Kj,0 = K
∗
j,0.
13
Since only equation (23) is the difference equation in the system (11), (12), (13), (22), and (23), from
their log-linearization, the following reduced dynamics of k2,t is obtained:
ln(k2,t+1/k
∗
2) = ρ
∗
k ln(k2,t/k
∗
2)− ξ ln(λ1,t/λ1), ξ ≡
λ1f
′(λ1)
f(λ1)
> 0,
the derivation of which is given in the Appendix. Table 2 reports the convergence coefficient ρ∗k in the
four cases. In all cases, the coefficient is very close to one. A transitory shock can have a prolonged
impact on the world economy.
13In the numerical analysis, I set these variables to K∗1,0 = 1 and K
∗
2,0 = k
∗
2 .
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Figure 3: Impulse responses in country 1 to a domestic financial shock
Note: Except for the growth rates, the variables are expressed in their percentage deviation from the balanced growth
equilibrium without shocks.
Figures 3 and 4 report the impulse response functions of the major variables in countries 1 and 2,
respectively. The horizontal axis is the number of quarters. Except for the growth rates, I plot the
percentage deviations in the levels of the variables from the trends when the economy experiences no
shocks. The first panel shows the movement of the leverage ratio in each country. The second and third
panels in each figure report how such a country-specific shock affects the outcome of international trade
between the two countries. As the second panel shows, the price of intermediate composite declines in
both countries. As the third panel shows, the number of imported varieties increases in country 1, while
decreases in country 2. This comes from the mechanism similar to the comparative statics in Section
3.3. A financial crisis in country 1 decelerates domestic capital accumulation, which leads to a lower level
of capital in country 1 relative to that in country 2. The rental price of capital in country 2, r2,t, then
receives downward pressure in response. Such a change in the capital price uniformly decreases the prices
to produce country 2’s intermediate goods, which has the following two effects. First, this lowers the
price of the intermediate composite goods lower in both countries, as the second panel shows. Second, the
third panel shows, this changes the patterns of trade such that the imports of intermediate goods (i.e., the
extensive margin) increases in country 1 and decreases in country 2, which is the result of international
competition.
The change in the price of the intermediate composite goods affects the price of the final good used
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Figure 4: Impulse responses in country 2 to a foreign financial shock
Note: Except for the growth rates, the variables are expressed in their percentage deviation from the balanced growth
equilibrium without shocks.
for investment, which in turn affects the real rate of return from holding capital stock. The fourth panel
in each figure shows this response. In both countries, the price of the investment good becomes low. In
country 1, the real rate of return on investment accordingly increases. However, this rise is not so large
relative to the direct effect of the negative financial shock. Consequently, capital accumulation continues
to slow down in this country. In country 2, the decline in the rental price of capital offsets the decline in
the final good price. Then, the rate of return declines and capital accumulation also slows down in this
country, even though it does not experience the financial shock directly.
The panels in the second row in each figure report the size and length of the impact of this financial
shock on real GDP and real exports.14 The fifth and sixth panels show their growth rates on an annual
basis. After the shock, the growth rates recover to the common balanced growth rate. The seventh and
eighth panels report the responses of the levels of real GDP and exports. Because of the endogenous
growth mechanism, even a transitory shock has a sustained effect on these levels. As the seventh panel
in these figures shows, compared to country 1, which experiences the trigger event, the GDP in country
2 drops less seriously. However, the result also suggests that the drop in GDP does not hit the bottom,
even after 80 quarters (that is, 20 years) passes. Thus, the drop in the country 2’s GDP is very prolonged.
14In this model, the real value of exports is always equal to that of imports (Exportsj,t = Importsj,t).
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In addition, the eighth panel in Figure 4 shows that the degree of decline in exports is larger than that
of GDP. This is partly consistent with the Great Trade Collapse observed during the 2008-09 financial
crisis.
Finally, the ninth and tenth panels in the third row report the decomposition of the change in real
exports into the change in the extensive and intensive margins. In this model, the extensive margin of
exports in country j, denoted by EMj,t, is equal to the number of varieties that country n buys from
country j, pinj,t. Then, the intensive margin of exports is
IMj,t =
Exportsj,t
EMj,t
.
The ninth panel in Figure 4 suggests that the extensive margin of exports increases in country 2. This
makes sense given the aforementioned reason that the financial shock in country 1 increases the amount of
country 2’s exported varieties. The tenth panel in this figure shows that the intensive margin of exports
decreases sharply in country 2, such that it offsets the increase in the extensive margin to decrease its
exports. This occurs because the intensive margin of exports in country 2 depends crucially on the GDP
level in country 1.
The numerical results here are summarized as follows. First, the credit crunch to the capital investors
in country 1 induces recessions in both countries, even in the absence of cross-border financial transactions.
Since country 2 does not experience the financial shock directly, its real GDP does not drop so much.
Second, however, the shift may be more sustained than in country 1. Third, the real value of exports in
country 2 declines more seriously than its real GDP. Fourth, this drop is caused mainly by the change at
the intensive margin rather than at the extensive margin. The connection between financial shocks and
endogenous productivity growth has an important role in internationally synchronized recessions and the
collapse of trade.
5 Concluding remarks
The existing studies that examine the international transmission of financial shocks paid little attention to
international trade. In particular, they assume a single good economy or assume a fixed extensive margin
of trade. This study constructs a simple two-country model featuring financial frictions, endogenous
growth, and endogenous trade status. I explore how financial shocks in one country affect the potential
for a recession in another country via both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. The connection
of financial shocks and endogenous productivity growth is the key to generate a prolonged global recession
and determine the contribution of the intensive margin to the trade collapse. These results complement
findings in prior studies.
The tractability of the model here enables further research in some different directions. Among others,
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it would be interesting to relax the assumption that the iceberg trade costs are exogenous. As already
stated, after the trade collapse during the 2008-2009 crisis, some trade economists identified trade credit
or trade financing as its possible cause. Although its empirical validity is mixed according to previous
studies, it might be important to examine its role as the transmission channel in both the qualitative
and quantitative sense. Therefore, relating the trade costs to the degree of financial frictions would be a
promising extension.
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An investor’s optimization and aggregation
Let mij,t ≡
(
rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ
)
kij,t − (1 + rj,t)d
i
j,t−1 denote investor i’s net income in real terms. As noted
in the main body, each investor can decide aij,t, x
i
j,t, and d
i
j,t after observing his/her investment efficiency
sij,t, which implies that both m
i
j,t and s
i
j,t are state variables in period t. Then, the optimization problem
is formulated as the following Bellman equation:
Vj,t(m, s) = max
a
{
ln(m− a) + βEt
[
Vj,t+1
(
mj,t+1(a, s), s
′
)]}
,
where mj,t+1(a, s) is the net income in period t + 1, which is given by the following static optimization
problem:
mj,t+1(a, s) = max
x
{(
rj,t+1/p
f
j,t+1 + 1− δ
)
sx− (1 + rj,t+1)(x− a) | 0 ≤ x ≤ (1 + λj,t)a
}
.
By solving the static problem, the optimal investment and borrowing are
(xj,t(a, s), dj,t(a, s)) =
(0, −a) if smin ≤ s < s
c
j,t,
((1 + λj,t)a, λj,ta) if s
c
j,t ≤ s ≤ smax,
(24)
where scj,t is defined in the main body of the manuscript. Then, mj,t+1(a, s) is given by mj,t+1(a, s) =
Rj,t+1(s)a, where
Rj,t+1(s) ≡
1 + r
d
j,t+1 if smin ≤ s < s
c
j,t,
(1 + λj,t)
(
rj,t+1/p
f
j,t+1 + 1− δ
)
s− λj,t(1 + r
d
j,t+1) if s
c
j,t ≤ s ≤ smax.
Using this result, the first-order condition of the first problem is
1
m− a
= βEt
[
Rj,t+1(s)
∂Vj,t+1(m
′, s′)
∂m′
]
.
Suppose that the value function takes the form Vj,t(m, s) = vj,t(s)+κ lnm, where vj,t(s) is a time-varying
parameter and κ is a time-invariant parameter. Since m′ = Rj,t+1(a, s), the above condition implies
a = βκm/(1 + βκ) and the Bellman equation therefore becomes
vj,t + κ lnm = log
(
1
1 + βκ
m
)
+ βEt
[
vj,t+1(s) + κ lnRj,t+1(s) + κ ln
(
βκ
1 + βκ
m
)]
,
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which gives κ = 1/(1− β). Then, one can obtain
aij,t = βm
i
j,t = β
[(
rj,t/p
f
j,t + 1− δ
)
kij,t − (1 + r
d
j,t)d
i
j,t−1
]
.
Since net income mij,t is determined when the value of s
i
j,t is realized, a
i
j,t(= βm
i
j,t) is independent of
sij,t. Therefore, the aggregate wealth Aj,t is expressed as
∫
adFj,t(a), where Fj,t is the resulting distribution
of aij,t. Furthermore, since s is i.i.d. across agents, one needs no information on Fj,t to obtain the ag-
gregate values. Equation (24) provides the aggregate investment, Xj,t =
∫ ∫ smax
smin
xj,t(a, s)dG(s)dFj,t(a) =
(1+λj,t)Aj,t(1−G(s
c
j,t)), which is (9) in the main body of the manuscript. In the same way, the resulting
amount of aggregate capitalKj,t+1 isKj,t+1 ≡
∫ ∫ smax
smin
sxj,t(a, s)dG(s)dFj,t(a) = (1+λj,t)Aj,t
∫ smax
scj,t
sdG(s),
which is equivalent to (10).
Supplement to Section 3.1
Applying Shepherd’s lemma to the unit cost functions of the final and intermediate goods sectors,
rj,tK
m
j,t(ω) = αν
mpmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω),
wj,tL
m
j,t(ω) = (1− α)ν
mpmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω),
pmj,tM
m
j,t(ω) = (1− ν
m)pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω),
rj,tK
f
j,t = αν
fpfj,tY
f
j,t,
wj,tL
f
j,t = (1− α)ν
fpfj,tY
f
j,t,
pfj,tM
f
j,t = (1− ν
f )pfj,tY
f
j,t.
Using these equations, one can rewrite the market-clearing conditions of capital, labor, and the interme-
diate composite in the main body of the manuscript as follows:
rj,tKj,t = αν
m
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω)dω + αν
fpfj,tY
f
j,t, (25)
wj,tLj = (1− α)ν
m
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω)dω + (1− α)ν
fpfj,tY
f
j,t, (26)
pmj,tMj,t = (1− ν
m)
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω)dω + (1− ν
f )pfj,tY
f
j,t. (27)
Derivation of wj,tLj =
1−α
α rj,tKj,t : Equations (25) and (26) immediately imply this equation.
Derivation of equation (13): The condition for the trade balance is∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω =
∫
ω∈Ωnj,t
pmn,t(ω)y
m
n,t(ω)dω. (28)
28
Now I show that this equation reduces to (13).
Using (25), one can rewrite equation (27) as
pmj,tMj,t = p
f
j,tY
f
j,t +
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω)dω −
1
α
rj,tKj,t. (29)
Equation (28) can be expressed as15∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t (ω)dω = p
m
j,tMj,t.
Therefore, equation (29) shows that the term pfj,tY
f
j,t is equal to rj,tKj,t/α. From this result and equation
(27), one obtains
pmj,tMj,t =
1− νf
νm
rj,tKj,t
α
. (30)
Since demand for ω is ymj,t(ω) = Mj,t
(
pmj,t(ω)/p
m
j,t
)−σ
, the total expenditure in country j for country n’s
product is expressed as∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω =Mj,t(p
m
j,t)
σ
∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
(
pmj,t(ω)
)1−σ
dω. (31)
Let pmjn,t(ω) = τjnbn,t/zn,t(ω) denote the demand price of variety ω if country j buys it from country n.
The distribution of pmjn,t(ω) is given by
Prob(pjn,t(ω) ≤ p) = 1− exp
[
−Tn(τjnbn,t)
−θpθ
]
.
Since pmj,t(ω) = p
m
jn,t(ω) for ω ∈ Ωjn,t,∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
(
pmj,t(ω)
)1−σ
dω = Tn(τjnbn,t)
−θθ
∫ ∞
0
pθ−σ exp
(
−Φj,tp
θ
)
dp, (32)
where Φj,t ≡
∑
j′∈{1,2} Tj′(τjj′bj′,t)
−θ.Using the definition of the gamma function Γ(v) =
∫∞
0 u
v−1 exp(−u)du,∫ ∞
0
pθ−σ exp
(
Φj,tp
θ
)
dp =
1
θ
(Φj,t)
σ−1
θ
−1 Γ (1 + (1− σ)/θ) .
15The zero-profit condition of the intermediate composite firm is
pmj,tMj,t =
∫ 1
0
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω =
∫
ω∈Ωjj,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω +
∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
pmj,ty
m
j,t(ω)dω.
From this result, the trade balance (28) is rewritten as
pmj,tMj,t =
∫
ω∈Ωjj,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω +
∫
ω∈Ωnj,t
pmn,t(ω)y
m
n,t(ω)dω.
In the above equation, the right-hand-side is the total sales of country j’s intermediate goods firms, where the first term is
the domestic sales and the second term is the export sales. Therefore, using the market clearing condition of the intermediate
goods, the right-hand-side is expressed as
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t(ω)dω. Then, it follows that p
m
j,tMj,t =
∫
ω∈Ωj,t
pmj,t(ω)Y
m
j,t(ω)dω.
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Substituting this result into (32) and using the fact that pmj,t and pijn,t are respectively given by p
m
j,t =
Φ
−1/θ
j,t (Γ(1 + (1− σ)/θ))
1/(1−σ) and pijn,t = Tn(τjnbn,t)
−θ/Φj,t, one obtains∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
(
pmj,t(ω)
)1−σ
dω = pijn,t(p
m
j,t)
1−σ.
Substituting the above equation to the right-hand-side of equation (31) yields∫
ω∈Ωjn,t
pmj,t(ω)y
m
j,t(ω)dω = pijn,tp
m
j,tMj,t.
Then, the trade balance (28) is rewritten as
pijn,tp
m
j,tMj,t = pinj,tp
m
n,tMn,t.
Using equation (30), this further reduces to
pi12,tr1,tK1,t = pi21,tr2,tK2,t,
which is equation (13).
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of claim (i): From the definition of H(P˜m; r2,t), one can verify that limP˜m→0H(P˜
m; r2,t) = τ
−θ
12 ∈
(0, 1) and lim
P˜m→∞
H(P˜m; r2,t) = τ
θ
21 > 1. Differentiating H(P˜
m; r2,t) with respect to P
m yields
∂H(P˜m; r2,t)
∂P˜m
=
(1− νm)Qt[1− (τ12τ21)
−θ](P˜m)−ν
m[
τ−θ21 (P˜
m)1−νm +Qt
]2 > 0,
∂2H(P˜m; ·)
(∂P˜m)2
=
(1− νm)Qt[1− (τ12τ21)
−θ][
τ−θ21 (P˜
m)1−νm +Qt
]4 ∆,
where Qt ≡ (B2/B1)
θ(r2,t)
−θνm and
∆ ≡ −νm(P˜m)−ν
m−1
[
τ−θ21 (P˜
m)1−ν
m
+Qt
]2
− 2
[
τ−θ21 (P˜
m)1−ν
m
+Qt
]
τ−θ21 (1− ν
m)(P˜m)−2ν
m
< 0.
Then, H(P˜m; r2,t) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. These results show that there uniquely exists
the solution to equation P˜m = H(P˜m; r2,t) within the interval of (τ
−θ
12 , τ
θ
21).
Proof of claim (ii): One can find that
∂H(P˜m; r2)
∂r2
=
[1− (τ12τ21)
−θ](P˜m)1−ν
m
θνm[
τ−θ21 (P˜
m)1−νm +Qt
]2 Qtr2,t > 0,
30
and
lim
r2→0
H(P˜m; r2) = τ
−θ
12 , limr2→∞
H(P˜m; r2) = τ
θ
21,
which imply that P˜m(r2,t) is an increasing function of r2,t, and
lim
r2,t→0
P˜m(r2,t) = τ
−θ
12 , limr2,t→∞
P˜m(r2,t) = τ
θ
21.
Calibration details
Determination of λ1, λ2, smax, and smin: As stated in the main body of the manuscript, I specify
investment productivity as a uniform distribution: G(s) = (s− smin)/(smax− smin). Then, it follows that
sc(λj) =
λjsmax + smin
1 + λj
,
f(λj) = smax −
smax − smin
2(1 + λj)
,
1−G(sc(λj)) =
smax − s
c(λj)
smax − smin
=
1
1 + λj
.
Since f(λ1) = 1 is assumed, the ratio of debt to capital of active investors is
λ1(1−G(s
c(λ1)))
f(λ1)
=
λ1
1 + λ1
= 0.69,
from which one obtains λ1. In addition, since f(λ1) = 1, the balanced growth rate g
∗ satisfies
1 + g∗ = β(1/pf∗1 + 1− δ).
From the definition of the cutoff sc(λ1), it follows that s
c(λ1)(1/p
f∗
1 + 1 − δ) = 1 + r
d∗
1 . The balanced
growth rate g∗ and the real interest rate rd∗1 thus satisfy
1 + g∗ = β
1 + rd∗1
sc(λ1)
.
Therefore, by substituting sc(λ1) given above into this equation, one obtains
λ1smax + smin
1 + λ1
=
1 + rd∗1
β(1 + g∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
already known
. (33)
In addition, the assumption f(λ1) = 1 requires
smax −
smax − smin
2(1 + λ1)
= 1. (34)
Equations (33) and (34) determine smax and smin. Once r
d∗
2 is given, λ2 is determined by
1 + g∗ = β
1 + rd∗2
sc(λ2)
.
31
Thus, rd∗1 = r
d∗
2 implies λ1 = λ2.
Determination of τ12, τ21, B1, and B2: Since f(λj) = 1, the balanced growth condition (21) is
1 + g∗ = β(1/pf∗1 + 1− δ) = β(r
∗
2/p
f∗
2 + 1− δ),
which gives pf∗1 and p
f∗
2 /r
∗
2 as
pf∗1 = p
f∗
2 /r
∗
2 = q
f ≡ β/[1 + g∗ − β(1− δ)].
From equation (11), one obtains both of pm∗1 and p
m∗
2 /r
∗
2 as q
m ≡ (qf/ψf )1/(1−ν
f ). By use of qm, equations
(18) and (19) are respectively rewritten as
1 = (ψm)−θ (qm)θν
m
[
Bθ1 +B
θ
2τ
−θ
12 (P˜
m)−1
]
, (35)
1 = (ψm)−θ (qm)θν
m
[
Bθ1τ
−θ
21 P˜
m +Bθ2
]
. (36)
Using equation (13), one can express pi∗12 and pi
∗
21 as
pi∗12 = B
θ
2τ
−θ
12 (ψ
m)−θ(qm)θν
m
(P˜m)−1, (37)
pi∗21 = B
θ
1τ
−θ
21 (ψ
m)−θ(qm)θν
m
P˜m. (38)
Since ψm = [(1 − α)/α](1−α)ν
m
is known, equations (35)–(38) include 6 unknowns, τ12, τ21, B1, B2
pi∗12, pi
∗
21, and P˜
m. As stated in the main body of the manuscript, pi∗12 is determined by
1− νf
νm
pi∗12 = 0.135,
where the value of the right-hand side is the target value of U.S. imports to its GDP share from the data.
Then, I determine pi∗21 using (14):
pi∗21 = pi
∗
12 ×
1
r∗2k
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
already known
.
I assume τ12 = τ21 = τ . Then, equations (35)–(38) provide τ , B1, and B2, together with P˜
m.
Log-linear approximation
Let a hat over a variable indicate the log-deviation of the variable from its stationary value. For ex-
ample, k̂2,t = ln k2,t − ln k
∗
2 ≃ (k2,t − k
∗
2)/k
∗
2. The log-linear approximation of the system around
32
(pf∗1 , p
f∗
2 , p
m∗
1 , p
m∗
2 , pi
∗
12, pi
∗
21, r
∗
2, k
∗
2, λ1) is
p̂f1,t = (1− ν
f )p̂m1,t, (39)
p̂f2,t = ν
f r̂2,t + (1− ν
f )p̂m2,t, (40)
p̂m1,t = pi
∗
11
[
(1− νm)p̂m1,t
]
+ pi∗12
[
νmr̂2,t + (1− ν
m)p̂m2,t
]
, (41)
p̂m2,t = pi
∗
21
[
(1− νm)p̂m1,t
]
+ pi∗22
[
νmr̂2,t + (1− ν
m)p̂m2,t
]
, (42)
pi12,t = −θ
[
νmr̂2,t + (1− ν
m)p̂m2,t − p̂
m
1,t
]
, (43)
pi21,t = −θ
[
(1− νm)p̂m1,t − p̂
m
2,t
]
, (44)
pi12,t = pi21,t + r̂2,t + k̂2,t, (45)
k̂2,t+1 = k̂2,t + µ
∗
1p̂
f
1,t + µ
∗
2(r̂2,t − p̂
f
2,t)− ξλ̂1,t, (46)
λ̂1,t+1 = ρλλ̂1,t, (47)
where µ∗1 ≡ 1/[1 + (1 − δ)p
f∗
1 ] ∈ (0, 1), µ
∗
2 ≡ r
∗
2/[r
∗
2 + (1 − δ)p
f∗
2 ] ∈ (0, 1), and ξ ≡ λ1f
′(λ1)/f(λ1) > 0.
Equations (41) and (42) reduce to 1− pi∗11(1− νm) −pi∗12(1− νm)
−pi∗21(1− ν
m) 1− pi∗22(1− ν
m)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ J
 p̂m1,t
p̂m2,t
 =
 pi∗12νmr̂2,t
pi∗22ν
mr̂2,t
 ,
where the determinant of matrix J is
det J = [1− pi∗11(1− ν
m)][1− pi∗22(1− ν
m)]− pi∗12pi
∗
21(1− ν
m)2
= 1− (pi∗11 + pi
∗
22)(1− ν
m) + pi∗11pi
∗
22(1− ν
m)2 − pi∗12pi
∗
21(1− ν
m)2
= 1− (2− pi∗12 − pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m) + (1− pi∗12)(1− pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m)2 − pi∗12pi
∗
21(1− ν
m)2 (∵ pijj = 1− pijn)
= 1− (2− pi∗12 − pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m) + (1− pi∗12 − pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m)2
= 1− 2(1− νm) + (1− νm)2 + (pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m)− (pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m)2
= (νm)2 + (pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)(1− ν
m)νm
= νm [νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)] > 0.
Then,
p̂m1,t =
1
νm [νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pi
∗
12ν
mr̂2,t −pi
∗
12(1− ν
m)
pi∗22ν
mr̂2,t 1− pi
∗
22(1− ν
m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= η∗1 r̂2,t, (48)
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and
p̂m2,t =
1
νm [νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1− pi
∗
11(1− ν
m) pi∗12ν
mr̂2,t
pi∗21(1− ν
m) pi∗22ν
mr̂2,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= η∗2 r̂2,t, (49)
where η∗1 and η
∗
2 are respectively defined as
η∗1 ≡
pi∗12
νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)
∈ (0, 1),
η∗2 ≡
pi∗12 + ν
m[1− (pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)]
νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)
∈ (η∗1, 1).
Substituting (48) and (49) into (43) and (44), pi12,t and pi21,t are respectively given by
pi12,t = −θ
[
νm(r̂2,t − p̂
m
2,t) + p̂
m
2,t − p̂
m
1,t
]
= −θ [νm(1− η∗2) + η
∗
2 − η
∗
1] r̂2,t
= −ζ∗pi∗11ν
mr̂2,t, (50)
and
pi21,t = −θ [(1− ν
m)η∗1 r̂2,t − η
∗
2 r̂2,t]
= −θ [(1− νm)η∗1 − η
∗
2] r̂2,t
= ζ∗pi∗22ν
mr̂2,t, (51)
where ζ∗ ≡ θ/[νm + (1− νm)(pi∗12 + pi
∗
21)] > 0. Substituting (50) and (51) into (45),
r̂2,t = −h
∗k̂2,t, (52)
where
h∗ ≡
1
1 + νmζ∗(pi∗11 + pi
∗
22)
∈ (0, 1).
Using (39) and (40), one can rewrite equation (46) as
k̂2,t+1 = k̂2,t + (1− ν
f )
[
µ∗1p̂
m
1,t + µ
∗
2
(
r̂2,t − p̂
m
2,t
)]
. (53)
Substituting (52) into (48) and (49),
p̂m1,t = −η
∗
1h
∗k̂2,t, (54)
r̂2,t − p̂
m
2,t = −(1− η
∗
2)h
∗k̂2,t. (55)
Then, substituting (54) and (55) into (53) gives
k̂2,t+1 = ρ
∗
kk̂2,t − ξλ̂1,t,
34
where
ρ∗k ≡ 1− (1− ν
f )h∗ [µ∗1η
∗
1 + µ
∗
2(1− η
∗
2)] .
When λ1 = λ2, it follows that 1/p
f∗
1 = r
∗
2/p
f∗
2 is satisfied and hence µ
∗
1 = µ
∗
2 = µ
∗ holds. Then, ρ∗k is
simplified to
ρ∗k = 1− (1− ν
f )h∗µ∗ (1 + η∗1 − η
∗
2) ∈ (0, 1).
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